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Managerial compensation and its determinants has remained a hot topic and research results 
have experienced tremendous growth in the US and other developed countries (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990; Yermack, 1996; Core et al, 1999; Swan and Sung, 2008; Cornett et al, 2008), but only a few 
studies has been conducted in China. Indeed, China provides an interesting research background in 
relation to managerial compensation with the adoption of market economy through corporatization 
and privatization2. As a consequence of the economic reform and corporate restructuring, a number 
of enterprises with various ownership characteristics are listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. The managers of listed firms in China become more powerful in corporate decision 
making and hence in determining the shareholders’ wealth (Groves et al, 1994; Clarke, 2003), while 
the agency problem that managers take the actions on their own interest has drawn owners’ serious 
concerns. Therefore, an appropriate incentive mechanism that aligns the interest of managers with 
that of shareholders acts an important role in solving agency problem and in the success of Chinese 
economic reforms (Firth et al, 2006).  
The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between managerial compensation and 
firm performance in China’s listed firms. Much of the theoretical and empirical research has been 
conducted in developed countries. China’s listed firms have a special ownership feature that the 
largest shareholders have a substantially dominant control over the direction of the firms. Therefore, 
we examine whether the ownership structure has an impact on the compensation of top executives 
and pay-performance relation in different types of firms. Some of the prior studies use the dominant 
share type representing owner type, and this standard can lead to bias results (Chen et al, 2008). In 
this study, we aim to examine the impact of ownership structure in a more sophisticated way. We 
carefully identify different types of final controlling shareholders based on different motivations 
                                                 
2 Corporatization is the fact that former state-controlled enterprises were transformed to modern listed firms, and 
Privatization means that former SOEs issued shares to the public, while the central government is still controlling the 
dominant role, so the corporate restructuring in China is partial.   
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and re-clarify the state and legal entity shareholders. Further, this paper applies a comparatively 
new panel data of China’s listed firms during the period from 2002 to 2005 for empirical study. 
Due to the historical reasons3, the ownership structure of listed firms in China is significantly 
different to that of their counterparts in other countries. The shares issued in China can be divided 
into three types: state shares, legal entity shares and tradable common shares. State shares are held 
by central and local government while legal entity shares are held by state-owned enterprises. Both 
state shares and legal entity shares are not tradable on stock exchanges, but are transferable under 
the approval of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Tradable common shares are 
in the hands of individuals and private organizations, which can be traded on either of Shanghai or 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. On average state shares and legal entity shares account for two-thirds of 
total outstanding shares in firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchanges.  
One of the unique ownership characteristic in China is that for the majority of the listed firms, 
government and legal entities are the largest and dominant shareholders who play a highly 
controlling role within the firms. The largest shareholders own 46 percent of a firm on average 
while the second largest shareholder usually owns only 5 percent of a firm on average (Xu, 2004). 
Following an introduction of the market-oriented economy in China, traditional Chinese firms have 
been modernised into publicly-listed firms. Given the separation of ownership and control, 
managers are entitled to a greater discretion in making decisions within the firms. Consequently, it 
is the largest shareholders who have the greatest incentive to monitor managers’ behaviour, as the 
cost of such monitoring would be far beyond the level other shareholders are willing to tolerate. The 
implication is that there exists a varying nature of objective between different shareholders in a firm. 
This leads us to predict that different types of firms are likely to operate different incentive schemes 
in an attempt to induce their managers to act properly. We document that about 78.79 percent of 
total listed firms are controlled by holders of state shares or legal entity shares, while only 21.21 
                                                 
3 China has experienced planned economy, during which period all of the firms were under the state control and given 
no autonomy.  Even after listing on stock exchanges, ownership structure was still highly concentrated.   
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percent are owned by individuals or private organizations. Compared to the corresponding literature 
from developed countries (Core et al, 1999), we expect that ownership structure has the potential to 
influence managerial compensation in Chinese firms. After controlling for other firm and industry 
characteristics that may influence managerial compensation we find that manager pay is higher and 
pay-performance relation is more significant when a firm is private-controlled than is state-
controlled. For example, if firms are controlled by private shareholders, the measurement for stock 
market performance has a greater impact on manager compensation, compared to the case when 
firms are controlled by non-private shareholders. Our regression results also reveal that compared to 
firms without foreign ownership, top executives in firms with foreign ownership are more highly 
compensated. Some of the prior research on Chinese managerial compensation argued that state-
controlled firms often operate inefficiently and place little emphasis on pay-performance scheme 
(Firth et al, 2006). In contrast, we find that when the ultimate controlling shareholder is the central 
government, there is a significant relation between manager compensation and firm-related 
variables such as accounting performance, stock market performance and corporate value.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior literature relevant to this 
study while Section 3 describes the institutional background and hypotheses. Section 4 presents the 
data and methodology. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
2 Literature review 
 
From the early 1980s, a large literature has accumulated on the study of managerial 
compensation. A managerial compensation is considered as an incentive mechanism offered by 
shareholders to management in an attempt to align their interests and solve the principal-agency 
problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  
There is also a growing body of literature which examines the relationship between 
ownership structure and managerial compensation from several different perspectives. For example, 
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Mehran (1995) documents that firms with higher ownership concentration held by outside 
shareholders intend to use less equity-based compensation. Furthermore, Core et al (1999) provide 
evidence that the ownership concentration of Chief Executive Official (CEO) shareholdings or 
outside blockholders is a decreasing function of executive compensation. In addition, similar 
research has also been conducted in other economies, such as the UK (Conyon, 1997), Italy 
(Brunello et al, 2001), New Zealand (Gunasekaragea and Wilkinson, 2002), Norway and Sweden 
(Randoy and Nielsen, 2002), HongKong (Cheng and Firth, 2006) and Japan (Basu et al, 2007), they 
all document a positive relation between managerial compensation and firm performance.  
Specifically, the separation of ownership and control which is known to cause agency 
problem raises further issues in managerial compensation research. Based on the agency theory, 
Murphy (1999) argues that the most effective mechanism to align the interests of managers to the 
interests of shareholders is to relate managers’ compensation to firm performance. However, 
evidence in the prior literature is mixed. Most of the studies conducted in developed countries 
document a strong and positive relationship between firm performance and managerial 
compensation. For instance, Mehran (1995) focuses on the structure rather than the level of 
compensation and investigates the relationship with firm performance in the context of the firm’s 
ownership structure and the composition of board of directors. He uses 153 randomly-selected 
manufacturing firms from 1979 to 1980 and finds that firm performance is positively related with 
managerial compensation. Using cash salary and bonus payments as a proxy for fixed compensation 
with a dataset of 452 U.S. industrial companies between 1984 and 1991, Berger et al (1997) suggest 
that CEOs' salary and bonus compensation has low sensitivity to changes in firm value. In contrast, 
examining a similar issue using Japanese stocks, Kato and Kubo (2006) find a significant 
relationship between CEOs pay and firm performance. 
More recently, a few researches related to managerial compensation have been done in China. 
Kato and Long (2005) first document a significant relation between managerial compensation and 
 5
firm performance. Following Jensen and Murphy (1990), they suggest that a 1000 RMB increase in 
shareholder value of the firm induces a 0.053 RMB increase in CEO pay. Low pay-performance 
sensitivity has also been documented by Frith et al (2006) in China’s listed firms. Examining the 
relation between ownership structure and managerial compensation, they find that pay-for-
performance is insignificant in government and legal entity controlled firms. Moreover, Fan et al 
(2007) argue that politically-connected CEOs in newly and partially privatized firms have a 
negative effect on first-day stock return. They also argue that boards are composed of bureaucrat 
directors in the firms with politically-connected CEOs rather than directors with relevant 
professional background. 
In light of the literature review above, much emphasis in the literature appears to be given to 
the discussion of the performance-based pay scheme for top management. Consequently, such 
performance-based remuneration scheme is argued to provide incentives for managers to work 
towards increasing the shareholder value of the firms (Firth et al, 2006). Nevertheless, little 
attention has been paid to the question of how managerial compensation and pay-performance are 
related to each other under the presence of heterogeneous ownership structure.  
Most of listed firms in China show a strong preference for equity issue on the stock market as 
a mean to raise new capital, which is contrary to the expectations of the pecking order theory. Also, 
the majority of the listed firms in China are state-owned enterprises and the top executives in these 
firms are bureaucrats appointed by government, which explains a dominant and controlling role of 
government in management of such firms. Consistent with the foregoing discussion, executive 
compensations, including salary and bonus, in state-owned enterprises are found to be less sensitive 
to performance-based indicators (Yueh, 2004). Being the largest shareholders, government and 
legal entities can easily exert social responsibility on firms for issues other than profits 
maximization and pay the CEOs according to civil service pay scale. If individuals or private 
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organizations play a controlling role within the firm, they recommend that CEOs be paid based on 
firm performance. 
However, the rapid economic growth and economic restructuring in China, especially 
following the participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 2001, have contributed to 
the improvement of corporate governance and firm performance of many Chinese firms. 
Accordingly, this resulting economic environment is expected to influence on the determinants of 
managerial compensation in China. This paper will fill this gap by providing the study of how 
executive compensation relates to firm performance and is determined for publicly traded firms in 
China after accessing WTO, choosing a comparative new panel data from 2002 to 2005. 
Similar with some prior studies (e.g. Firth et al, 2006; Chen et al, 2008), we dig deeper on the 
issue of the ownership structure and grouping of shareholder objectives. There are three main types 
of shares issued in Chinese firms: state shares, legal entity shares and common tradable shares. 
Following the legal breakdown of shares, it does not adequately observe different motivations of 
shareholders (Firth et al, 2006). In this paper, we re-categorize the state and legal entity 
shareholders. State shares are owned and under the direct control by central government 
bureaucratic agencies, such as national asset management department. Meanwhile, legal entity 
shares can further be divided into two types: state-owned legal entity shares owned by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) and social legal entity shares owned by other legal entities. It is noted that the 
SOEs are also under the partial control of central or local government. Therefore, it is expected that 
both state shareholders and state-owned legal entity shareholders share a common motivation (Sun 
et al, 2002). We choose to re-divide state shareholders and legal entities (legal breakdown) into 
‘state-owned shareholders’ (including state bureaucratic agencies and SOEs) and ‘legal entity 
shareholders’ (referring to non-SOEs legal entities).    
3 Institutional background and hypotheses 
3.1 Institutional background 
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Ownership structure 
Before 1978, when the ‘open-door and reform’ policy was firstly introduced, the economy 
was operating under absolute control of the central government, and the profits of firms were 
remitted and allocated by the central government. Beginning in 1978 and going on throughout 
afterwards, China has achieved a great economic growth and industrial sector has been reformed. 
The firms were no longer under the central government absolute control, and were given some 
market-oriented incentives. By this way, firms were allowed to retain some profits and decision 
making has been shifted from state level to firm level, and managers were awarded explicit 
monetary rewards based on firm’s performance (Groves et al, 1994). As the reform continuing, the 
central government was trying to relinquish its shareholdings and selling them to the public. 
However, during this period, the government was still keeping dominant role over majority firms 
(Kato and Long, 2005). 4  This partial privatization of SOEs becomes the unique ownership 
characteristics in China, which were so different from other developed countries and transitional 
economies.  
Since 1990, most traditional SOEs have implemented corporatization and privatization and 
have been listed on one of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Those traditional 
SOEs often issued shares to the public in an attempt to raise new capital. All of shares issued by 
listed firms have been divided into two types, of which one third can be traded on the stock 
exchanges and held by individuals and private organizations, while the rest of the shares that can 
not be traded on the stock markets. These non-tradable shares are held by a group of bodies such as 
the government, SOEs agents and top executives, directors of boards and directors of supervisory of 
issuing firms, which make up to two thirds of total shares. This unique arrangement of share issues 
in China is called Share-split structure. However, the existing mechanism of share-split structure in 
turn creates some extent of conflicts between shareholders due to the presence of different rights 
                                                 
4 The state direct and indirect controlled firms account for about 78 percent of total listed firms.  
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between shareholders, which could result in profits of minority shareholders being invaded. By the 
end of 2004, approximately 714.9 billion shares have been issued with nearly 65 percent of these 
being non-tradable shares, 75 percent of which were held by the government and its bureaucratic 
agents.  
Managerial compensation 
Prior to the economic reforms, all of the Chinese firms were state-controlled. The managers 
in these firms, mostly bureaucrats, were paid according to the civil service pay scale. After 1978 
when the economic reforms took place, the responsibilities of decision-making had been shifted 
from government level to the firm level. As a result, managers were given some degree of 
autonomy in operating the firms. However, the firms were still left to be controlled by government. 
Under this partial reform, managers still lacked motivation and incentive to work towards 
maximising profits of the firm as most of the managers were still bureaucrats and therefore 
continued to be paid according to the civil service pay scale (Groves et al, 1994). 
The dilemma of providing a sufficient level of autonomy to management and simultaneously 
maintaining state control complicates the setting of managerial compensation. Before economic 
reform came into effect in China in 1978, all of the firms ran as representatives of the central 
government, especially in the sector of public services, such as the water and electricity supply 
industries. The managers of these firms were working as bureaucrats of the central government in 
contrast to their counterparts in other countries and they were paid in line with the civil service pay 
scale system. Accordingly, there were no strong incentives for them to work to maximise the firm’s 
profits.  
With the labour market reform during the early 1990s, a few significant changes have taken 
place. The enterprises have been awarded the discretion to recruit new employees and exercise the 
retention of profits (Clarke, 2003). Since 1992, listed firms were allowed to establish their own 
internal wage structures within the range of the wage budget set by the government, and 
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furthermore the pay for employees including top managers increased substantially. Subsequently, 
the introduction of a managerial compensation mechanism adopted from developed countries aimed 
to initiate profit-oriented incentives and relate manager remuneration to enterprise performance. 
During the period from 1995 to 1999, the sources of employee’s annual income changed more 
diversely, and the wage structure reflected less seniority-based pay (Yueh, 2004). The pay for 
managers has been increasing constantly such that the average pay for top executives is 
RMB130.22 thousand, RMB208.10 thousand and RMB196.25 thousand in 2002, 2004 and 2005, 
respectively. 
Managerial compensation mainly consists of four elements in developed countries; a basic 
salary, bonus, stock option and long-term incentives. However, under the condition of share-splits 
in China, manager rewards comprise a basic salary and short-term incentives, excluding stock 
option and long-term incentives. On one hand, managers are unlikely to agree with the offer of the 
stock options, as such option could not be exercised on secondary stock market therefore resulting 
in little benefits. On the other hand, based on the modern portfolio theory, once the managers 
receive the stock from the firm, they have to either sell them or exercise an equivalent portion of 
shares they already owned for diversification purposes (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). Also, the CEO 
turnover rate in China’s listed firms is extremely high (Firth et al, 2002), which tends to adversely 
affect the effectiveness of a long-term incentives scheme. Consequently, very few firms granted 
stock options to CEOs and top management as a means to provide long-term incentives. Total 
compensation for managers in China consists merely of a basic fixed salary and short-term 
incentives, including bonuses, which are related to firm operation performance. However, listed 
firms are not required to disclose a full component of the managerial compensation in the annual 
report, which makes it difficult to examine the effect on each component in detail.  
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As different types of controlling shareholders aim to achieve different objectives5, managers 
in different firms are expected to be compensated differently. Naturally, it follows that firms are 
likely to adopt distinctly different incentive schemes as a way to monitor the behaviour of managers. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
In the modern publicly traded corporations, ownership is separated from control which raises 
the ‘principal-agent’ problem. Shareholders are viewed as the ‘principals’ of the firm, while 
managers are viewed as the ‘agents’ who make important financing, investment and product-market 
decisions with the capital funded from outsiders aiming to achieve the goal of maximising 
shareholders’ wealth. Given the separation of ownership and control, the ex-ante contract offered to 
managers are effective, while the ex-post behaviours are unobserved by shareholders and other 
stakeholders, which may raise the problem of moral hazard and adverse selection. To successfully 
induce managers to act in the best interest of shareholders, the pay for senior managers should be 
related to the outcomes that can be observed. Therefore, the most effective incentive mechanism to 
align the interests of management and shareholders is to make managers’ compensation a function 
of firm performance (Murphy, 1999). The majority of the research in this subject have found a 
positive and statistically significant pay-performance relation (e.g. Conyon, 1997; Core et al, 1999; 
Basu et al, 2007). However, the firms are not running as perfectly as the theory suggests, as some of 
the prior research has provided evidence of low pay-performance sensitivity (e.g. Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Randoy and Nielsen, 2002; Girma et al, 2007; Swan and Sung, 2008).  
The economic reform introduced a modern management system into China’s companies. In 
particular, the China’s publicly-listed firms are becoming to fully follow world accounting and 
auditing standards and closely link their manager remunerations to firm performance in some extent. 
Under the principal-agent theory framework, we hypothesise that top manager pay is related with 
firm’s performance. This leads to the first hypothesis of this study:  
                                                 
5 State controlled and legal entity controlled firms have to satisfy their management bureaucrats, maintenance direct 
control on certain industries, recruit enough social employees and other social obligations (Clarke, 2003).   
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H1: There is a positive relationship between managerial compensation and firm performance.  
One of the important motivations of this study relies on the presence of the unique ownership 
structure in China’s listed firms. A primary feature of such ownership structure in China is that the 
largest shareholders predominantly direct and control firms’ decision-making process, for example, 
they exercise a significant influence on firms’ operations and management appointment. Based on 
Xu (2004) report, the largest shareholder owns 46 percent of a firm on average and the second 
largest shareholder owns only 5 percent of a firm on average. This suggests that the largest 
shareholders have a substantial control on the listed firms, which is quite different from the case in 
developed countries where the ownership is highly dispersed (Core et al, 1999).  
According to the Corporation Law of China, all the shares issued are divided into three types: 
shares owned by the government, shares owned by legal entities and shares owned by individuals or 
private organizations. Each type of share issues accounts for almost one-third of total shares 
outstanding. Moreover, the shares owned by government and legal entities can not be traded on the 
stock exchanges, while only the shares owned by individuals or private organizations are tradable. 
Although legal entities can enjoy the benefit arising from the placement of autonomy to some 
degree, they are still subject to the ultimate control of the central government. Therefore, 
approximately 65 percent of total shares are non-tradable and this induces the problem of lack of 
outside investor protection. Researchers in prior studies of China (Firth et al, 2007) believe that the 
firms where the government and its bureaucratic agents are the ultimate shareholders place a greater 
weight on firm profitability when deciding the level of CEO pay. Further, they argue that such firms 
are not strongly motivated to connect the pay for managers to stock market performance, because 
these controlling shareholders can not fully benefit from the equity market appreciation. In addition, 
top executives in these firms are bureaucrats and appointed by the central government and therefore 
their remunerations are determined according to civil service pay scale to some extent. 
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However, there is an increasing number of firms that are controlled by individuals or private 
organizations in the Chinese stock markets. The managers of such privately-controlled firms are 
selected from the experienced candidates who possess sophisticated knowledge and expertise in 
relevant areas. A principal objective for managers in these firms is to work for firm profit 
maximizations. Managers in particular industries in China are always having expertise and 
professional knowledge and specific human capital causes them to act in the best interests of 
shareholders. Different from shares owned by government and legal entities, the shares owned by 
individuals or private organisations can be readily issued to the public and exercised. Consequently, 
the dominant shareholders in privately-controlled firms are interested in maximising both firm 
profits and stocks’ market performance. Based on the foregoing discussion, we expect that firms 
having individuals or private organizations as the largest shareholders are likely to introduce 
performance-based pay scheme to motivate managers’ performance.  
Besides the high ownership concentration, another distinct ownership characteristic present in 
Chinese listed firms is that government or legal entity tent to be the largest shareholder of the listed 
firms in all industries, only minority of which is under the dominant control of individuals or 
private organizations. Subsequently, we expect the ownership structure of Chinese listed firms to 
have a substantial impact on executive pay. This leads us to present the following two hypotheses: 
H2: The executive pay is higher for firms controlled by individuals or private organizations than for 
firms controlled by government or legal entities.  
H3: The sensitivity of managerial compensation to firm performance is lower in government 
controlled firms.  
Besides the shares owned by central government, legal entities and individuals, Chinese listed 
firm are also allowed by CSRC to issue shares to foreign investors.6 It is widely accepted that 
foreign shareholders place a stronger emphasis on firm performance and exert pressure on hiring 
                                                 
6 It is noted that the portion of shares issued to foreign investors accounts for only a tiny part of total shares outstanding. 
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high-qualified CEOs with international experience (La Porta et al, 1999). This professional ‘human 
capital’ naturally demands a higher pay. On one hand, in order to make foreign investors interested 
in buying shares, firms have an incentive to adopt international corporate governance so as to be 
consistent with the standards practised in developed countries. On the other hand, given the fact of 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, foreign shareholders may prefer to relate 
managerial compensation to firm performance as the measurement for firms’ market performance is 
explicit and easily observable. 
Examining the influence of foreign shareholders on top executive pay and pay-performance 
relation in China’s listed firms, Firth et al (2006) document that although the foreign shareholders 
do not play a substantially controlling role, the role of foreign shareholder can not be neglected.  
H4: The executive pay is higher for firms which have issued foreign shares. 
H5: The presence of foreign shareholder influences pay-performance sensitivity.  
4 Methodology and Sample Data 
4.1 Methodology 
To examine the impact on managerial compensation of firm performance and ownership 
structure for the Chinese listed firms, both qualitative and quantitative methods are adopted in this 
study.   
A quantitative method is conducted to test how firm performance is related to manager pay in 
China when ownership structure varies across firms. Applying a modified version of the linear 
model used in Core et al (1999),7  we test the sensitivity of the level of manager pay to firm 
performance and other control variables, including firm size and board of directors’ variables. 
Moreover, to examine the impact of foreign monitoring, we include a dummy variable to separately 
code firms with and without foreign ownership. To investigate the effect of ownership structure on 
                                                 
7 A very similar model was also used by Kato and Kubo (2006) and Firth et al (2006).  
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the pay-performance relation, we also form interaction variables. The regression model to be tested 
is as follow: 
0 1 1 2 3 4 5
6 1 1 2            *                                                                        
Where
Industry is the row
it it it it it
it i t it
PAY PERF SIZE BOARD POND FOR
FOR PERF Industry Year
β β β β β β
β γ γ ε
−
−
= + + + + +
+ + + +
 vector based on SIC codes and Year is the column vector
 
PAY is the log of the average top three-executive compensation. PERF is the performance of 
the firm. To proxy for PERF, we use three different performance measures, return on assets (ROA) 
representing the accounting performance, annual stock return (RET) representing stock market 
performance and Tobin’s Q (TOBIN) representing corporate value, and we regress them in equation 
respectively. SIZE is the log of the total assets of the firm. BOARD is the size of the board measured 
by the log of the number of directors of the firm. POND is the composition of the board measured 
by the number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors of the board. 
FOR is a dummy variable coded one if the firm has foreign shareholders and zero otherwise. A 
prior literature suggests that the ownership structures tend to be interrelated with firm performance. 
To test whether such interaction significantly affects executive compensation, we include an 
interaction variable FOR·PERF. In addition to the coefficients of   are row vectors of relevant 
coefficients. Industry is a column vector of industry dummy based on SIC codes. Year is a column 
vector of yearly dummy.  
Table 1 provides definitions and symbols of variables included in our regression model. The 
choice of variables is explained below: 
From the theoretical framework perspective, almost all of prior studies conducted in 
developed countries have provided a positive relation between pay and firm performance (Conyon, 
1997; Core et al, 1999; Kato and Kubo, 2006). The performance-related pay has also been 
conducted for China’s listed firms. In this study, we expect firm performance to be one of major 
determinants of the managerial compensation. We employ three measurements for firm 
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performance. They are return on assets (ROA) which is a proxy for accounting measurement of firm 
performance, annual stock return for stock market performance, and Tobin’s Q for corporate value 
performance. The measurement of ROA is computed as net income divided by total assets. It is an 
accounting indicator which conveys information on firm profitability to shareholders and boards of 
directors and signals how efficiently management allocates and utilises shareholders’ resources in 
generating earnings. Therefore, it is considered as one of crucial determinants of managerial 
compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Firth et al (2006) argue that stock return is sufficiently 
efficient measure of a firm’s performance. Both ROA and stock return have been used to proxy for 
firm performance in other studies (Kato and Kubo, 2006 and Cheng, 2008 for ROA, Core et al, 
1999; Brick et al, 2006 and Firth et al, 2006 for stock return). Tobin’s Q has been widely used as a 
proxy of firm performance to measure corporate value (Mehran, 1995; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). 
Consistent with prior researches, we choose ROA, stock return and Tobin’s Q as dependent 
variables. To reflect the causal relation between CEO pay and corporate performance, we use 
lagged firm performance of prior year in the regression model.  
Table 1  
Variable definitions 
Variables Symbol Definition 
Compensation   
Managerial compensation PAY Log of top three executives total pay divided by three 
   
Firm performance   
Return on assets ROA Net income/total assets 
Stock return RET Annual stock return 
Tobin’s Q  TOBIN Market value/replacement value 
   
Firm characteristics   
Firm size SIZE Log of total assets 
Board size BOARD Total number of directors on the board 
Board composition POND Percentage of independent directors 
   
Ownership structure   
Foreign share ownership FOR Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign shareholders (B and H) 
   
Other variables   
Industry1 IND Equal to 1 for the specific industry 
Year2 YEAR Equal to 1 for the specific year 
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We exclude financial institutions in our sample.  
1, 2 To avoid dummy variable trap, we use 11 industry dummy variables to represent 12 industries in our sample, these 
industries are agricultural mining, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water supply, construction, transportation, 
technology, commercial, property, public service and communication; we also use 3 year dummy variables to represent 
four years in our sample, covering from 2002 to 2005.  
  
For the selection of control variables, a vast body of literature suggests that the relation 
between firm size and managerial compensation is significantly positive (Jones and Kato, 1996; 
Conyon, 1997; Firth et al, 1999; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Chalmers et al, 2006; Girma et al, 
2007). We believe that firm size is an important determinant of managerial compensation in China. 
Other control variables are chosen to consider the impact of board of directors on managerial 
compensation. Prior studies suggest that a large board makes decision-making procedures more 
complicated and less effective. The implication is that such corporate environment may allow 
managers to expropriate shareholder value (Cheng, 2008). Therefore, we expect board size to be 
one of the factors that determine managerial compensation and use the number of directors on the 
board as a measurement of board size. We further consider the effect of independent directors and 
compute the variables as the number of independent directors divided by total number of directors 
on the board. 
As discussed in the section of literature review, the largest shareholder has the potential and 
substantial impact on pay for managers and different dominant shareholders tend to prefer different 
incentive pay schemes. One of the main reasons discussed was that the shares they owned grant 
different rights, for example, the state and legal entity shares can not be traded on stock exchanges. 
Individually-owned firms were considered to be one of the kinds that were likely to be attracted to 
performance based incentive schemes. To examine the impact of ownership structure on CEO pay 
and pay-performance relation in different types of firms, we divide our total sample into three sub-
samples; the case in which controlling shareholders are state-owned shareholders, legal entity 
shareholders and individual shareholders, respectively.8 We run the regression model for each of 
the three sub-samples. Furthermore, to test whether foreign shareholders have a preference for 
                                                 
8 Definitions and categorisation of different types of shareholders were discussed in Section 3.   
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performance-based pay schemes, we include a dummy variable FOR and interaction term 
FOR·PERF. 
From SinoFin database, we obtain the information relate to compensation for top three 
executives in China’s listed firms. From 1998, all of listed firms in China were asked to disclose the 
level of payment for senior managers, board of directors and supervisory members in their annual 
report. However, the information disclosed by the firms is limited to total payment for top 
executives which include salary, bonus and other income. Therefore, a complete information on the 
components of total compensation was not obtainable. Given payment information obtained, we use 
the log of top three executive total pay divided by three as a measurement of managerial 
compensation, PAY. 
4.2 Sample Data 
We start with all firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
from 2002 to 20059 and then tailor the population into our sample. First, from the total listed firms, 
we eliminate financial firms, which is consistent with previous literature for the special firm 
consideration for regulated industries. Secondly, we exclude all the observations that do not have a 
complete record on the variables in our analysis and also those firms that have missing data in the 
fields required regularly in the calculations of the measurements used in our analysis. Thirdly, we 
delete PT and ST companies, as the inclusion of these firms may bias results of the research. 
Therefore, the designated sample in our research consists of 1119 firms, and 4502 firm-year 
observations covering 2002 to 2005. In this study, all the financial and accounting data are obtained 
from the firms’ annual reports and some authoritative database, such as CSMAR and SinoFin. The 
other data on the ownership structure and executive compensation is assembled from SinoFin.   
                                                 
9 The reason we choose this period is that on one hand from 2001 on, all of listed firms have disclosed their complete 
managerial compensation information on their annual reports, and new international auditing and accounting standard 
have been adopted. On the other hand, the data for 2006 and 2007 are extremely unstable and this will bias the results. 
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There are some reasons for the selection of the sample period. First, although from 1998, 
some of listed firms in China have begun to disclose remunerations for top executives in their 
annual reports, this only makes up minority of total listed firms and therefore could not represent 
China’s stock market. However, since 2001 almost all of listed firms, covering all industries, 
disclose their pay for managers in their annual reports. Secondly, many of the listed firms in China 
began to adopt international auditing and accounting standards which resulted in firms’ auditing 
section departing from their parent company after 2001. Lastly, the corporate restructuring process 
has entered into a new era with a rapid development after joining WTO, and the use of more recent 
data depicts more accurately the impact of the current reform of corporate governance quality on 
compensating management in transition economy. Moreover, after a careful examination of the data, 
we find that the data for 2006 and 2007 are unstable, for example, the average pay for top 
executives has jumped ten times or even more from 2005 to 2006 then to 2007. For this reason, we 
exclude this period in order to keep a relative stable data serials. 
4.3 Statistics Description 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for managerial compensation, firm performance, 
ownership structure, board characteristics and firm characteristics of the total sample. The results 
indicate a steady increase in managerial compensation across the sample periods, with mean of 
RMB130.22 thousand in 2002, RMB168.45 thousand in 2003, RMB208.10 thousand in 2004, to 
RMB196.25 thousand in 2005. The overall pay levels range from RMB6.6 thousand to 
RMB1575.31 thousand, RMB7.6 thousand to RMB1628.23 thousand, RMB10.3 thousand to 
RMB1716.67 thousand, RMB10 thousand to RMB4443.47 thousand in 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 
respectively. The pay level in China appears much lower compared with its counterpart in some 
developed countries. The pattern observed in descriptive statistics of the compensation based on 
ownership structure is consistent with our hypotheses. The mean pay for managers is RMB108.68 
thousand for the firms where the government is the dominant shareholder, while it is RMB110.58 
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for individually-controlled firms and RMB104.45 for firms controlled by legal entity shareholders. 
Further, for firms with foreign shareholders, the mean of pay level is RMB162.42.  
Table 2  
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Year Mean Max Min Std. Dev. 
Compensation        
Average pay (000s RMB) 2002 130.22 1575.31 6.6 121.71 
 2003 168.45 1628.23 7.6 149.10 
 2004 208.10 1716.67 10.3 190.74 
 2005 196.25 4443.47 10.0 211.18 
Firm performance      
ROA % (Return on assets)   2002 2.91 20.40 -33.84 4.28 
 2003 2.80 20.97 -22.26 4.38 
 2004 1.60 31.42 -132.95 8.80 
 2005 0.61 22.13 -168.26 11.68 
RET % (Stock return) 2002 -19.60 72.86 -60.7 16.50 
 2003 -10.44 129.57 -82.58 27.67 
 2004 -14.11 95.96 -90.93 23.78 
 2005 -14.59 175.30 -74.42 25.45 
TOBIN (Tobin’s Q value) 2002 1.24 23.44 0.38 0.99 
 2003 1.10 33.40 0.37 1.12 
 2004 1.00 31.93 0.33 1.20 
 2005 0.84 12.89 0.23 0.45 
Firm characteristics a      
Assets (million)   4030  719000  27.30 17700 
BOARD (number of directors)   9.77  23  2  2.20 
POND    3.12  10  0  0.94 
Compensation based on ownership b      
GOV  (000s RMB)  507.84 13300 15.32 525.39 
PRI    (000s RMB)  506.49 5121.17 20.00 530.03 
SLE   (000s RMB)  467.16 2222.70 50.00 395.07 
FOR   (000s RMB)  857.15 13300 56.00 995.33 
Ownership structure c      
GOV (government shares)  75.39%    
GOV (state control)  21.86%    
GOV (SOE control)  55.5%    
PRI (private shares)  21.21%    
SLE (legal entity shares)  3.40%    
FOR (foreign shares)  8.97%    
GOV represents state-controlled firms, and PRI represents private-controlled firms and SLE represents legal-entity 
controlled firms. FOR represents the firms with foreign shareholders.  
RMB is China’s currency. Logarithm is applied here for all value variables in regressions.     
a b c The valuables in the categories of firm characteristics, compensation and ownership structure are represented as the 
average of four years from 2002 to 2005.  
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Firm performance statistics show that means of return on assets (ROA) are 2.91%, 2.80%, 
1.60% and 0.61% in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, respectively. The means of stock return (RET) are 
-19.60%, -10.44%, -14.11% and -14.59 for 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, with ranges from -90.93% 
to 175.30% per annum. The means of Tobin’s Q (TOBIN) are 1.24 in 2002, 1.10 in 2003, 1.00 in 
2004 and 0.84 in 2005. Consistent with evidence shown in prior work on China’s stock market, the 
behaviour of measurements for accounting performance and firm value is comparatively modest 
over the periods while that of the stock market performance varies dramatically. The results suggest 
that differing measurements may convey different aspects of the firm performance. Stock return 
(RET) is to reflect shareholders’ expectation about firms’ future profitability therefore is forward 
looking, while return on assets (ROA) is rather used to measure firm profitability as a historical 
record. For the Tobin’s Q value, it has been widely accepted as a measurement of firm value.  
We also distinguish China’s listed firms into three separate groups based on the type of 
dominant shareholders and they are firms where the largest shareholder is the government, 
individual or private organization and social legal entities, respectively. The government is the 
dominant shareholder in 75.39 percent of listed firms, individual or private organization is the 
dominant shareholder in 21.21 percent of listed firms, and 3.40 percent of listed firms are under the 
ultimate control of social legal entity shares. Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics of variables 
in three sub-samples. Also, we document that 8.97 percent of the firms included in our total sample 
have issued foreign shares (B shares and H shares).  
Table 3  
Descriptive statistics of subsamples 
 Mean Max Min 




507.84 506,49 467.16 13300 5121.17 2222.70 15.32 20.00 50.00 
ROA (%) 2.76 1.26 3.06 44.44 26.35 46.31 -135.12 -168.26 -34.4 
RET (%) 36.06 47.57 27.29 849.72 1611.8 558.43 -86.69 -90.93 -52.32 
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TOBIN 1.11 1.32 1.17 11.07 23.44 5.87 -2.37 0.33 0.52 
SIZE 
(million) 4740 2040 2240 719000 39200 10600 122 27.3 255 
BOARD 9.98 9.18 9.4 21 23 20 2 4 5 
POND 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.6 0.75 0.56 0 0 0.11 
observations 3394 955 153 3394 955 153 3394 955 153 
PAY is the average pay of top three executives. ROA is return on assets. RET is stock return at the end of certain fiscal 
year. TOBIN is Tobin’s Q representing firm value. SIZE is the firm total assets. BOARD is the total number of 
directors on the board. POND is the proportion of independent director on the board. GOV, PRI and SLE stand for 
controlling shareholders of government, private and legal entity respectively.  
5 Empirical results 
 
We first observe correlations between each pair of independent variables to examine the 
presence of multicollinearty. Correlation matrix for all variables used in this study is presented in 
Table 4. for all pairs of the variables, the magnitude of correlations does not exceed 0.27 and 
therefore, the relations between variables appear small.  
Table 4  
Correlation matrix between all variables (SIZE is measured by the log of total assets) 
 ROA RET Tobin SIZE BOARD POND 
ROA 1      
RET 0.27 1     
Tobin -0.04 0.12 1    
SIZE 0.16 0.23 -0.25 1   
BOARD 0.03 0.05 -0.08 0.19 1  
POND -0.07 0.15 -0.30 0.13 -0.04 1 
ROA is return on assets. RET is stock return at the end of certain fiscal year. TOBIN is Tobin’s Q representing firm 
value. SIZE is the log of firm total assets. BOARD is the total number of directors on the board. POND is the 
proportion of independent director on the board. 
 
Table 5 provides the results of the regression analysis. We estimate the regression model for 
each of three sub-samples and each sub-sample represents a group of firms with a relevant 
controlling shareholder.10 For each sub-sample, three regressions are estimated; the first uses return 
on assets (ROA), the second uses stock return (RET) and the third uses Tobin’s Q as a firms 
                                                 
10 In the regression of each sub-sample, we delete outliers and incorrect data. 
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performance measure. The results are shown in the second, third and fourth columns in Table 5, 
respectively.  
The results show that firm performance is positively related with managerial compensation in 
government-controlled firms using all of the three PERF measurements: ROAt-1, RETt-1 and Tobin’s 
Qt-1 (See Panel A). The relation is also significantly positive for firms controlled by social legal-
entity when PERF is measured by ROAt-1 (See Panel B) and for privately-controlled firms when 
PERF is measured by ROAt-1 and RETt-1 (See Panel C). The results are statistically significant at the 
5 percent level at minimum. This results support our hypothesis 1 that managerial compensation is 
positively related with firm performance. Most of extant studies on China’s listed firms provided 
evidence that state-controlled firms were running with low efficiency and tended not to apply 
performance-based pay scheme for top executives (Firth et al, 2006, 2007). Contrary to the 
evidence found in prior studies but consistent with hypothesis 1, our results support that managerial 
compensation is positively related with firm performance. Using a relatively new panel data, it is 
found that for government-controlled firms (Panel A), there is a significantly positive relation 
between CEO pan and firm performance (PERF) regardless of the choice of the measurement for 
PERF. For firms controlled by legal entity (Panel B), the largest shareholders appear to adopt 
accounting performance-based incentive scheme in CEO payment settings. For privately-controlled 
firms (Panel C), a significantly positive relation between CEO pay and lagged stock return (in 
addition to ROA) is documented, which is contrast to evidence found in other studies in China 
(Firth et al, 2007). 11 
Table 5 
Regression of compensation on firm performance, ownership structure and firm characteristics 
Dependent variables Average Pay Average Pay Average Pay 
(measurement) ROA RET TOBIN 
Panel A: regression on the sample of GOV 
Intercept 6.49*** (11.61) 5.93*** (10.16) 5.25*** (8.97) 
PERF (ROAt-1) 2.02*** (6.83)   
PERF (RETt-1)  0.14** (2.80)  
                                                 
11 The prior studies showed no relation between CEO pay and lagged firm performance (measured by stock return) with 
the sample of China’s listed firms ranging from 1998 to 2000.   
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PERF (TOBINt-1)   0.20*** (3.44) 
Firm characteristics    
SIZE 0.25*** (9.70) 0.28*** (10.35) 0.30*** (11.31) 
BOARD 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.13) 0.01 (0.15) 
POND 0.31 (1.38) 0.27 (1.17) 0.29 (1.28) 
Ownership structure    
FOR 0.31*** (3.65) 0.29*** (3.51) 0.28** (1.95) 
FOR*PERF 0.27 (0.32) -0.22* (-1.78) 0.01 (0.01) 
Other variables    
Industry Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.21 0.21 
observation 3394 3394 3394 
Panel B: regression on the sample of SLE 
Intercept 9.04** (2.52) 8.43** (2.17) 9.01** (2.15) 
PERF (ROAt-1) 4.26** (2.39)   
PERF (RETt-1)  0.41 (1.18)  
PERF (TOBINt-1)   0.09 (0.36) 
Firm characteristics    
SIZE 0.09 (0.60) 0.11 (0.69) 0.09 (0.50) 
BOARD 0.10 (0.20) 0.01 (0.25) -0.04 (-0.56) 
POND 2.08 (1.03) 2.89 (1.32) 3.04 (1.43) 
Ownership structure    
FOR -0.10 (-0.04) 0.50 (0.35) -1.17 (-0.17) 
FOR*PERF 13.76 (0.25) 1.31 (0.11) 1.55 (0.23) 
Other variables    
Industry Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.44 0.42 
observation 153 153 153 
Panel C: regression on the sample of PRI 
Intercept 5.93*** (5.08) 5.74*** (4.75) 5.36*** (4.42) 
PERF (ROAt-1) 0.97** (1.97)   
PERF (RETt-1)  0.37** (2.71)  
PERF (TOBINt-1)   0.03 (0.32) 
Firm characteristics    
SIZE 0.25*** (4.66) 0.27*** (4.83) 0.28*** (5.15) 
BOARD 0.02 (0.94) 0.02 (0.80) 0.02 (0.93) 
POND 0.64 (0.79) 0.55 (0.66) 0.62 (0.76) 
Ownership structure    
FOR 0.63** (2.60) 0.38 (1.36) 0.77 (0.75) 
FOR*PERF 1.43 (0.58) -1.71** (-2.00) -0.16 (-0.16) 
Other variables    
Industry Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.25 0.25 0.24 
observation 955 955 955 
Managerial compensation is the log of the Average Pay. PERF are measured by ROA, stock return and Tobin’s Q in the 
regressions, respectively. SIZE is the log of total assets. BOARD is the total number of directors on the board. POND is 
the proportion of independent director on the board. FOR is the dummy variable and values 1 when the firm has foreign 
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investor. We include Industry and Year dummy variables to control the industry and time effects. GOV, SLE and PRI 
stand for controlling shareholders of government, private and legal entity respectively.  
T-statistics are in parentheses, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent standard error. *, **and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
The purpose of dividing the total sample into three sub-samples is to investigate whether the 
behaviour of performance-pay relation for CEO compensation differs across firms with different 
ownership structure.  As discussed, the coefficients of PERF in Panel A (where the firms are 
government-controlled) are positive and significant using all the three measurements of PERF. This 
result indicates that government-controlled firms advocate managers’ pay based on firm 
performance. Some of prior research argued that the shares held by the largest shareholders in state-
controlled firms can not be traded on the secondary market therefore hardly gaining from any share 
price increases. It follows that the largest shareholders in state-controlled firms tend to place less 
focus on stock market performance and the prior results show no significant relation between stock 
return and CEO pay as in Firth et al (2007). However, it is noted that Firth et al (2007) examine the 
sample period from 1998 to 2000, which precedes our sample period. Studying the sample period 
from 2002 to 2005, the empirical results in this study suggest that firms’ market performance does 
have a significant impact on the determination of CEO remuneration in recent period in China.  
In Panel C (where the firms are private-controlled), the coefficients for PERF is positive and 
significant when PERF is measured by ROAt-1 and RETt-1, and insignificant when is measured by 
TOBINt-1. Unlike government-controlled firms, the shares in the hands of the largest shareholders in 
privately-controlled firms can be easily traded on stock exchanges and consequently the 
stockholders can benefit from share price increases. This result in Panel C suggests that CEO 
compensation in privately-controlled firms is more sensitive to corporate profitability as well as to 
stock market performance. In Panel B (where the firms are legal entity-controlled), the coefficients 
of PERF are significant when PERF is measured by ROAt-1, and insignificant when is proxied by 
RETt-1 and TOBINt-1. This indicates that CEO compensation in legal entity-controlled firms are most 
responsive to firm’s accounting performance.  
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The coefficients of RETt-1 in private-controlled firms are larger than that in government-
controlled firms and legal entity-controlled firms. For example, in Panel C, the privately-controlled 
firms have a higher PERF coefficient of 0.37 compared to those of other firms (0.14 for state-
controlled firms and insignificant coefficient for legal entity-controlled firms). This results support 
our hypotheses 2 and 3 that pay-performance sensitivity in privately-controlled firms is higher than 
that in government-controlled and legal entity-controlled firms. It also indicates that private 
blockholders put much more weight than other stake owners on firm stock performance recently, 
and this provides adequate incentives for managers. However, in terms of ROAt-1 and TOBINt-1, 
government-controlled firms have both higher and significant coefficients than other firms.  
The dummy variable, FOR has positive coefficients in Panel A and Panel C, and panel B 
when firm performance is measured by RETt-1. This provides evidence for hypothesis 4 that 
foreign-invested firms pay their managers much more higher compared with non-foreign-invested 
firms. The interaction terms FOR*PERF are positive when firms are legal-entity controlled (Panel 
B), while mixed in Panel A and Panel C. FOR*RETt-1 has a negative and significant coefficient in 
Panel A and Panel C. This gives evidence for hypothesis 5 that foreign-invested firms put more 
weight on stock market behaviour. As we argued above, in China the largest shareholders are 
always holding a large proportion of total share and acting the dominant roles in firm operation. 
Consequently, foreign investors feel less reliable and would like to put rigorous pressure on CEOs. 
This provides support that the presence of foreign investors is more efficient and focusing on stock 
market performance, in order to avoid from expropriating shareholder value. This also indicates that 
foreign investors are powerful enough to influence the pay-performance relation.  
As we expect, firm size, SIZE (measured by log of firm total assets), is positively and 
significantly associated with managerial compensation. This is consistent with the findings in other 
studies (Conyon, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Firth et al, 2006) that state managering large firms need 
more skill and experience. Across the three sub-samples, the coefficients for the total number of 
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directors on board, BOARD, and the proportion of independent director on the board, POND, are 
found to be insignificant. Since 2001, it is required for all of listed firms in China that at least one-
third of the board members are independent directors. This might make firms including independent 
directors to meet the stipulation need rather than moderate the problem of internal control (Clarke, 
2003).   
To control for firm-level variables that might be correlated with time, the regression model 
are re-estimated on a yearly basis. The results are similar to those shown in Table 5, indicating a 
significant influence of ownership structure on managerial compensation over this period. To be 
consistent with the method used in other researches from developed countries, the regression 
models are re-run by regressing CEO pay on current firm performance measurements and lagged 
firm size. Inconsistent with the results found in developed countries, we do not find any significant 
association between CEO pay and current company performance, which was either measured by 
ROA, stock return or Tobin’s Q. We conjecture that this discrepancy in results may be attributable 
to the difference in payment mechanisms among countries. Most countries, including China, apply 
‘yearly salary system’ on CEO compensation, so the payment for current year is always decided 
based on firm performance in the prior year.  The regression models are also re-estimated using 
lagged firm size. The results are broadly similar to those shown in table 5 therefore are not reported.  
6 Conclusion  
 
Accessing to WTO accelerates China’s economic reform and corporate restructuring process. 
The corporate governance including remuneration mechanism has substantially changed (Yueh, 
2004) for China’s listed firms. From 2002 onward, all of the listed firms were required by rule to 
disclose the information on their managerial compensation. We take this advantage to collect data 
and examine the determinants of managerial compensation and how close it is to firm performance. 
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The central question of this study is whether managerial compensation is related to firm 
performance and how this relation is in different types of firms. China is carrying out economic 
reform and transforming SOEs into modern profitable firms, how managers are compensated can be 
viewed as the indicator of the success of reform and in turn the quality of corporate governance 
(Firth et al, 2006). Therefore, it is important to set the managerial compensation properly. We 
examine the pay-performance relation in more detailed. We partition the total sample on the basis of 
controlling shareholders and find a positive and significant relation between CEO pay and lagged 
firm performance in state-controlled firms, legal entity-controlled firms and private-controlled firms. 
Moreover, different measurements of firm performance give different incentives to managers.  
The empirical results also provide evidence that ownership structure has a significant 
influence on executive pay and pay-performance relation. Managers are compensated higher in 
privately-controlled firms in term of stock market performance. The compensation is promoted in 
government-controlled firms based on accounting measure of performance. The presence of foreign 
shareholder is associated with higher CEO pay. This is also consistent with our hypothesis that 
foreign investors and private shareholders prefer to push firms to adopt performance-related pay for 
managers. Moreover, in different types of firms, foreign-investors prefer incentive pay schemes to 
relate with different firm performances.    
Firm size is positively and significantly related to managerial compensation as we expect. 
This result is consistent with most of other researches (e.g. Conyon, 1997; Core et al, 1999; Firth et 
al, 2006). However, we can not find any statistically significant evidence of the influence from 
board size and independent directors.   
One of the limitations is that data availability compared with research in developed countries. 
Though the listed firms started to disclose information of managerial compensation in their annual 
reports, they are total compensation for managers without any breakdown into components (such as 
salary and bonuses). As salary is basic and fixed payment and bonus is related with firm 
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performance, so it is difficult to tell how much bonuses are included in the total compensation and 
whether they are paid according to firm performance. Another problem we face is that CEO pay is 
not given out directly. We can just obtain the data of total compensation of top three executives, and 
we assume CEOs are paid highest. We use the log of average pay level of top three executives as 
the proxy of managerial compensation in this research.  
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